skills/tony363/superclaude/sc-mcp/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sc-mcp

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill integrates the mcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_BASH_TOOL, which allows the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands on a remote system as part of automated workflows.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The mcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH tool provides a Python sandbox environment, enabling the execution of dynamic Python scripts at runtime to process data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The mcp__pal__clink tool facilitates external CLI integration, extending the agent's ability to run system-level commands through its reasoning component.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes persistence mechanisms via mcp__rube__RUBE_MANAGE_RECIPE_SCHEDULE, allowing the creation and scheduling of automated workflows using cron expressions that can execute arbitrary code over time.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a high risk for indirect prompt injection due to its complex integration surface:
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context from over 500 integrated applications (e.g., Slack messages, GitHub PR bodies, Jira tickets) as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill definition lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within external data payloads.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to highly privileged tools including REMOTE_BASH_TOOL and REMOTE_WORKBENCH which can be triggered by these workflows.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from third-party services before it is used to influence tool parameters or execution logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 08:42 AM