The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it instructs the agent to ingest and act upon data from untrusted external sources.
Ingestion points: Terminal output captured via run_command (e.g., API responses, build logs) and visual/textual data from the browser_subagent (e.g., web page content).
Boundary markers: The validation protocol does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from obeying malicious commands embedded in the evidence it captures.
Capability inventory: The agent has access to run_command for shell execution, file system modification capabilities (writing to .gsd/JOURNAL.md and .gsd/STATE.md), and web browsing via browser_subagent.
Sanitization: There are no requirements to sanitize, filter, or validate the content of verification evidence before it is integrated into the agent's context or persistent logs.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation explicitly directs the agent to use run_command for critical validation steps, including build processes (npm run build), API testing (curl), and file system verification. While these are intended for legitimate quality assurance, they represent a high-privilege capability that could be abused if the agent is influenced by malicious data.

Empirical Validation