compat-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill fetches and applies external code changes using
gh pr diff {number} --repo toss/es-toolkit | git apply. It then executes this unverified code throughyarn vitest run. Since PRs can be submitted by any GitHub user, this represents an execution path for untrusted code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on several shell commands including
gh,git, andyarn. These tools are used to modify the local filesystem and execute JavaScript/TypeScript code based on external inputs (PR numbers). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It instructs the agent to read the PR title and body (
gh pr view) to determine the target function and required test cases. An attacker could embed malicious instructions in a PR description to influence the agent's reporting or behavior. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
gh pr viewoutput (PR title and body). - Boundary markers: None. The agent is instructed to "Extract directly from the PR description."
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
Bash(gh, git, yarn, vitest) and file writing viaWritetool. - Sanitization: None. The agent processes the raw PR text without filtering.
Audit Metadata