call-codex

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the codex CLI with the --full-auto flag, which grants the secondary process the ability to write to the workspace without user confirmation.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local source code and transmits it to an external AI model for processing. While this is the intended purpose, it involves sending potentially sensitive data to a remote service.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external third-party binary (codex) and suggests installation through brew, introducing a dependency on software from an external source.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted file content into a prompt for a secondary AI agent.
  • Ingestion points: File contents are read from the local system (e.g., utils.py) and placed into the prompt template in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown code blocks as delimiters but depends primarily on a natural language instruction ("Do NOT modify any files...") to prevent the secondary agent from taking harmful actions.
  • Capability inventory: The codex tool is configured with workspace-write permissions in SKILL.md, making it capable of modifying the local environment if an injection succeeds.
  • Sanitization: There is no escaping or sanitization of the content being analyzed, allowing instructions within the code to potentially override instructions given to the secondary agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 12:57 AM