zeroize-audit
Audited by Runlayer on Feb 27, 2026
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
If `mcp_mode=prefer`: set `mcp_available=false`, continue without MCP, apply confidence downgrades | | Serena can resolve at least one symbol in the TU | Log a warning; proceed but mark findings from that TU as `needs_review` | **Rust note**: Cargo does not natively produce `compile_commands.json`. Use `bear -- cargo build` or `bear -- cargo check` to generate it.
--- ## Post-Processing After collecting all MCP evidence and running IR/ASM/CFG analysis, apply confidence gates mechanically: ```bash python {baseDir}/tools/mcp/apply_confidence_gates.py \ --input /tmp/raw-report.json \ --out /tmp/final-report.json \ --mcp-available \ --mcp-required-for-advanced ``` Omit `--mcp-available` if MCP was unreachable.
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
Look for: ```llvm %key.0 = phi i64 [ %loaded_key, %entry ], [ 0, %cleanup ] ``` If `%key.0` is used after the phi but the `0` arm is only reached on one path, the secret may persist in the non-zero arm.
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
") return 2 # Create output directory try: os.makedirs(out_dir, exist_ok=True) except OSError as exc: sys.stderr.write(f"Error: cannot create output directory: {exc} ") return 3 # Write poc_common.h common_h = _generate_common_header(secret_fill, stack_probe_max) with open(os.path.join(out_dir, "poc_common.h"), "w") as f: f.write(common_h) # Generate PoCs makefile_targets: list[dict[str, str]] = [] manifest_entries: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] generated_count = 0 manual_count = 0 for finding in ex
Tool passed security scan
Malicious tool definition detected
Description: to analyze") parser.add_argument("--out", required=True, help="Output JSON file") args = parser.parse_args() # Default patterns sensitive_patterns = [ r"\b(secret|key|seed|priv|private|sk|shared_secret|nonce|token|pwd|pass)\b" ] wipe_patterns = [ r"\bexplicit_bzero\s*\(", r"\bmemset_s\s*\(", r"\bOPENSSL_cleanse\s*\(", r"\bsodium_memzero\s*\(", r"\bzeroize\s*\(", ] # Build CFG builder = CFGBuilder(Path(args.src), sensitive_patterns, wipe_patterns) try: builder.build_from_source() exc
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
grep -qE \ 'llvm\.memset|volatile|explicit_bzero|sodium_memzero|OPENSSL_cleanse|SecureZeroMemory|memset_s|store i8 0|store i64 0|store i32 0' \ "$1" } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Normalize all input files into temp files. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FILES=("$@")
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
# # Usage: # track_dataflow.sh --src path/to/file.c --config config.yaml --out /tmp/dataflow.json # # Detects: # - memcpy/memmove of sensitive buffers # - Struct assignments (potential copies) # - Function arguments passed by value # - Return by value (secrets in return values) usage() { echo "Usage: $0 --src <file> --out <analysis.json> [--config <config.yaml>]" >&2 } json_escape() { local s="$1" s="${s//\\/\\\\}" s="${s//\"/\\\"}" s="${s//$' '/\ }" s="${s//$'\t'/\\t}" printf '%s' "$s" } SRC=
Tool passed security scan
Malicious tool definition detected
Description: in_str: if ch == "\\" and k + 1 < len(line_text): k += 2 # skip escape sequence continue elif ch == '"': in_str = False else: if ch == '"': in_str = True elif ch == "/" and k + 1 < len(line_text) and line_text[k + 1] == "/": break # rest of line is a comment elif ch == "{": depth += 1 in_body = True elif ch == "}": depth -= 1 k += 1 if in_body: body_lines.append((j + 1, lines[j])) # 1-based line number if in_body and depth == 0: i = j + 1 break else: i += 1 continue # Within body, f
Malicious tool definition detected
# # Usage: # analyze_asm.sh --asm path/to/file.s --symbol secret_func --out /tmp/analysis.json # # Detects: # - Register spills to stack (movq/movdqa %reg, -offset(%rbp/%rsp)) # - Stack allocations that may retain secrets # - Missing red-zone clearing # - Secrets in callee-saved registers pushed to stack usage() { echo "Usage: $0 --asm <file.s> --out <analysis.json> [--symbol <func_name>]" >&2 } json_escape() { local s="$1" s="${s//\\/\\\\}" s="${s//\"/\\\"}" s="${s//$' '/\ }" s="${s//$'\t'/\\
Malicious tool definition detected
Tool: zeroize-audit/workflows/phase-6-final-report.md Description: # Phase 6 — Report Finalization ## Preconditions - Phase 5 complete (or skipped if zero findings): `poc_final_results.json` exists or findings are empty ## Instructions Spawn agent `4-report-assembler` via `Task` with: | Parameter | Value | |---|---| | `workdir` | `{workdir}` | | `config_path` | `{workdir}/merged-config.yaml` | | `mcp_available` | From `orchestrator-state.json` routing | | `mcp_required_for_advanced` | `{{mcp_req
Malicious tool definition detected
Malicious tool definition detected
- "Optimized away" findings only allowed with compiler evidence (IR/asm diff). --- ## Inputs See `{baseDir}/schemas/input.json` for the full schema.
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