reviewing-pull-requests
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
gh(GitHub CLI) andlinear-clitools to fetch PR details, diffs, and issue information. These commands use user-provided arguments (PR numbers, team IDs) to interact with local and remote environments.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from external sources that can be controlled by third parties. * Ingestion points: Pull request titles, bodies, and code diffs are fetched usinggh pr viewandgh pr diff. Related issue descriptions are fetched usinggh issue viewandlinear-cli issue. * Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or delimiters to separate the untrusted PR/issue content from the agent's internal logic, nor do they instruct the agent to ignore embedded commands. * Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write back to external platforms usinggh pr reviewto submit comments, approve changes, or request modifications. * Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from GitHub or Linear before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata