tuzi-image-gen

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/providers/google.ts uses execSync to run curl commands when a proxy is configured. The shell command is constructed by interpolating environment variables like HTTPS_PROXY and GOOGLE_BASE_URL without sufficient sanitization, which could allow shell injection if these environment variables are maliciously set.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to several external image generation services, including the vendor's own API at api.tu-zi.com and well-known services from Google, OpenAI, Alibaba (DashScope), and Replicate. These are documented neutrally as well-known service endpoints.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to load and use sensitive credentials from the local file system. It reads .env files from the project root and the user's home directory (~/.tuzi-skills/.env), transmitting the discovered API keys to the respective external providers.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted data that could be used for indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: Prompt data is ingested from CLI arguments and files (--promptfiles), and configuration is loaded from EXTEND.md files.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers are used to delimit user-provided prompt content when it is forwarded to external APIs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, perform network operations, and modify the local file system.
  • Sanitization: The implementation does not appear to sanitize prompt strings or configuration values sourced from the environment before use in API calls or shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 02:21 PM