next-best-practices

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (MEDIUM): The skill employs deceptive instructions claiming the existence of 'Next.js 16' features like the proxy.ts rename and the /_next/mcp endpoint. These features do not exist in official Next.js releases (current stable is v15). This is a form of metadata poisoning intended to misguide the agent's behavior and capability assessment.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The debug-tricks.md file provides specific curl commands for the agent to interact with localhost:<port>/_next/mcp. It describes tools like get_errors, get_routes, and get_project_metadata as standard protocols. This encourages the agent to perform environment discovery and execute network requests to internal services based on fabricated 'best practices'.
  • INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The fabricated /_next/mcp endpoint serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection. If an agent is persuaded to query this local endpoint while working on a project controlled by an attacker, the project could return malicious JSON-RPC responses to influence the agent's next actions.
  • Ingestion points: curl requests to localhost endpoints described in debug-tricks.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is told to trust these as standard developer tools.
  • Capability inventory: The skill assumes the agent can execute shell commands (curl) and process JSON-RPC responses.
  • Sanitization: None provided for the data returned from the local dev server.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (SAFE): References to @next/codemod and @next/third-parties use trusted sources (Vercel/Next.js). The download patterns are standard for the described (though partially fabricated) migration tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:50 PM