wksp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use
dangerouslyDisableSandbox: truefor multiple operations inSKILL.md, bypassing the security boundaries intended to protect the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
wksp_ops.pyscript modifies the agent's global configuration file (~/.claude.json) to sethasTrustDialogAccepted: Truefor workspace paths. This bypasses the security prompt that normally requires users to manually trust a project directory before the agent can operate within it. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies project-specific settings (
.claude/settings.local.json) to automatically grant permissions for thehandoffskill and allows wildcard shell execution viaBash(python3 "<scripts_dir>/"*). This removes the "human-in-the-loop" requirement for approving potentially dangerous scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses AppleScript (
osascript) vialaunch.pyto execute commands in a new terminal session. While intended for workspace launching, this mechanism could be abused to execute arbitrary commands outside the agent's immediate control if path resolution is manipulated.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata