claude-typer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in SKILL.md uses an unsafe bash template: /usr/local/bin/python3 "$skill_dir/scripts/render_claude_typer.py" "<prompt>".
  • Directly interpolating user-supplied input into a shell command string allows for command injection if the input contains control characters like backticks, semicolons, or dollar signs.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/render_claude_typer.py renders content from https://www.laosunwendao.com using the Remotion CLI.
  • This involves executing JavaScript from an external, non-trusted source within a headless browser environment, which could be leveraged to exploit the local system or access sensitive files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The inclusion of a --runner-prefix argument allows the agent to define the base command used for execution.
  • This high-privilege capability can be manipulated through prompt injection to trick the agent into executing arbitrary shell commands instead of the intended rendering tools.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes packages from the npm registry at runtime and fetches composition data from a third-party domain.
  • It uses npx to download @remotion/cli and @remotion/tailwind-v4 from npm, and fetches assets from https://www.laosunwendao.com, which is not a recognized trusted vendor or well-known service.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 02:50 PM