Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill processes PDF documents which are untrusted external data sources. Maliciously crafted PDFs could contain hidden instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during data extraction or form filling operations.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is read via
pypdfandpdfplumberinscripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, andscripts/fill_pdf_form_with_annotations.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts do not implement specific delimiters or warnings to the model to ignore instructions embedded within the PDF data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for file creation, metadata extraction, and execution of system utilities.
- Sanitization: Absent. Text and metadata from the PDF are processed without specific sanitization before being presented to the agent.
- Dynamic Execution (LOW): The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyuses runtime monkeypatching (monkeypatch_pydpf_method) to overridepypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inherited. While this is a form of self-modifying code (Category 10), it is explicitly documented as a workaround for a specific bug in thepypdflibrary related to selection lists and is essential for the skill's primary purpose of filling forms. - Command Execution (SAFE):
SKILL.mdprovides instructions for using standard system utilities such aspdftotext,qpdf, andpdftk. These tools are appropriate for PDF manipulation and are used in a standard manner.
Audit Metadata