persona-hr-coordinator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities due to the processing of untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
gws-gmail(email requests) andgws-drive(onboarding documents) as specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or specific directives to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested emails or documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network-adjacent and file operations via the
gwsbinary tools, includinggws gmail +send,gws drive +upload, andgws workflow +file-announce(Chat). - Sanitization: Although the tips suggest using a
--sanitizeflag for PII, this is not a mandatory constraint in the core instructions to mitigate instruction injection.
Audit Metadata