paper-plan
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
Bashto write files usingcatand heredocs if the primaryWritetool fails. Crucially, it directs the agent to perform this action "silently" and "NOT ask the user for permission," which reduces user oversight of shell command execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The workflow in Step 6 transmits the aggregated content of the paper outline (derived from local research files like
STORY.mdandNARRATIVE_REPORT.md) to an external model endpoint (gpt-5.4) via themcp__codex__codextool. This involves sending potentially sensitive, unpublished research data to a third-party service for analysis. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from various project files.
- Ingestion points: Reads contents from
NARRATIVE_REPORT.md,STORY.md,AUTO_REVIEW.md,IDEA_REPORT.md, andEXPERIMENT_LOG.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: None identified. Content from these files is directly merged into the outline and the subsequent review prompt for the external LLM.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Edit,WebSearch,WebFetch, and theAgenttool. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the ingested text is performed before it is processed or sent to other tools.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill mentions external methodologies and repositories in the acknowledgements section, including references to
Master-cai/Research-Paper-Writing-Skills,Galaxy-Dawn/claude-scholar, andImbad0202/academic-research-skills. These are documented as methodological inspirations and do not involve direct script downloads or execution within the skill's logic.
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