paper-slides
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bash(*)tool to execute various commands, includinglatexmk -$ENGINE, where$ENGINEis a variable that can be overridden by user arguments. This presents a potential command injection vector if input is not properly sanitized. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow automatically installs the
python-pptxpackage usingpip installif it is not detected on the system. While this is a common library, automatic package installation from external registries carries inherent supply chain risks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a Python script (
slides/generate_pptx.py) and executes it usingpython3. Executing code generated at runtime is a high-risk pattern as it can be manipulated if the source data is compromised. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill checks for the existence of
~/.claude/feishu.jsonto determine if it should send notifications. While used for integration, accessing sensitive configuration paths in the user's home directory is a behavior typically associated with data harvesting. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from paper sections (
paper/sections/*.tex) and uses it to construct prompts for themcp__codex__codextool. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in the LaTeX source could influence the model's behavior during the review phase.
Audit Metadata