paper-slides

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash(*) tool to execute various commands, including latexmk -$ENGINE, where $ENGINE is a variable that can be overridden by user arguments. This presents a potential command injection vector if input is not properly sanitized.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow automatically installs the python-pptx package using pip install if it is not detected on the system. While this is a common library, automatic package installation from external registries carries inherent supply chain risks.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a Python script (slides/generate_pptx.py) and executes it using python3. Executing code generated at runtime is a high-risk pattern as it can be manipulated if the source data is compromised.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill checks for the existence of ~/.claude/feishu.json to determine if it should send notifications. While used for integration, accessing sensitive configuration paths in the user's home directory is a behavior typically associated with data harvesting.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from paper sections (paper/sections/*.tex) and uses it to construct prompts for the mcp__codex__codex tool. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in the LaTeX source could influence the model's behavior during the review phase.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 4, 2026, 10:30 AM