qzcli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs its core logic from a third-party GitHub repository (
https://github.com/tianyilt/qzcli_tool).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the use of theBash(*)tool to perform environment setup, job submission, and interactions with the Qizhi platform.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages authentication credentials, including usernames and passwords, by storing them in local environment files (~/.qzcli/.env) and configuration files (~/.qzcli/config.json).\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes job statuses, resource names, and workspace details from the external Qizhi platform, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.\n - Ingestion points: Data from the shared platform is ingested via commands such as
qzcli ls,qzcli status, andqzcli res.\n - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are included in the prompt templates.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive capabilities, including full shell access (
Bash(*)) and file operations (Read,Write).\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of data retrieved from the remote platform before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata