research-lit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes untrusted data from external sources including arXiv abstracts, Semantic Scholar metadata, and web search results. A malicious paper abstract could contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during the synthesis phase.
- Ingestion points: WebSearch results, arXiv API results, Semantic Scholar API results, Exa search results, and local PDF content (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing external abstracts.
- Capability inventory:
Bash(command execution),Write(file modification),mcp__obsidian-vault__*(vault access),WebFetch(network access). - Sanitization: Not present. Content from external APIs is used directly for analysis and synthesis.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell scripts to locate and execute local Python helper scripts (e.g.,
arxiv_fetch.py,semantic_scholar_fetch.py). The research topic provided by the user is interpolated into these shell commands. While standard for this author's skills, it represents a potential surface for argument injection if the platform does not provide robust escaping for the$ARGUMENTSvariable. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches research metadata and optional PDFs from well-known academic services including arXiv, Semantic Scholar, and Exa. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose and target established, reputable research infrastructure.
Audit Metadata