research-lit

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes untrusted data from external sources including arXiv abstracts, Semantic Scholar metadata, and web search results. A malicious paper abstract could contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during the synthesis phase.
  • Ingestion points: WebSearch results, arXiv API results, Semantic Scholar API results, Exa search results, and local PDF content (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing external abstracts.
  • Capability inventory: Bash (command execution), Write (file modification), mcp__obsidian-vault__* (vault access), WebFetch (network access).
  • Sanitization: Not present. Content from external APIs is used directly for analysis and synthesis.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell scripts to locate and execute local Python helper scripts (e.g., arxiv_fetch.py, semantic_scholar_fetch.py). The research topic provided by the user is interpolated into these shell commands. While standard for this author's skills, it represents a potential surface for argument injection if the platform does not provide robust escaping for the $ARGUMENTS variable.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches research metadata and optional PDFs from well-known academic services including arXiv, Semantic Scholar, and Exa. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose and target established, reputable research infrastructure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 2, 2026, 04:28 AM