lazycat-dynamic-deploy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation in references/manifest-render.md provides examples where user-defined parameters (.U.target) are directly interpolated into backend_launch_command strings within the lzc-manifest.yml. This pattern is vulnerable to shell command injection if the user input contains shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |), as there are no instructions provided for sanitization or escaping.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The application.injects feature described in SKILL.md and references/injects.md allows for the injection of JavaScript into application frontend pages. The specification explicitly supports http(s):// as a source for these scripts, enabling the execution of arbitrary remote code in the user's browser context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The system is configured to fetch and execute scripts from external URLs via the scripts[].src field, which can point to untrusted remote domains.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data from lzc-deploy-params.yml and interpolates it into critical configuration files (lzc-manifest.yml).
  • Ingestion points: User-provided values are ingested via the lzc-deploy-params.yml file and accessed through the .U template variable.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The Go template syntax ({{ ... }}) is used directly without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious content.
  • Capability inventory: The rendered manifest can execute shell commands (backend_launch_command) and inject JS scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of input validation, escaping, or sanitization of user parameters before they are rendered into the final configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 09:33 AM