github-to-skills
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Dynamic Execution] (HIGH): The skill generates Python scripts in
scripts/wrapper.pyby directly interpolating the repository name into a code template. An attacker can craft a malicious GitHub URL where the repository name contains Python code (e.g., using quotes and semicolons), leading to arbitrary code execution when the generated script is run. Evidence:create_github_skill.pylines 53-61. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted README content from external repositories and includes it in the generated
SKILL.mdfor agent analysis. A malicious README could contain prompt injection attacks designed to manipulate the agent's behavior during the skill creation process. 1. Ingestion points:fetch_github_info.pyfetches README content viaurllib.request. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; README content is directly inserted intoSKILL.mdwithout delimiters. 3. Capability inventory: File system writes, directory creation, and placeholder script generation increate_github_skill.py. 4. Sanitization: Inadequate; only length truncation (10k characters) is performed on the ingested content. - [External Downloads] (SAFE): The skill makes network requests to
github.comandraw.githubusercontent.comto fetch repository metadata. These are trusted external sources per policy, so the download activity itself is considered safe. Evidence:fetch_github_info.pylines 24 and 39.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata