worklog
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence mechanism installation. The skill modifies the agent's core configuration file
~/.claude/settings.jsonto register aUserPromptSubmithook and useschmod +xto make the script executable. This ensures the hook script (log-prompt.sh) executes automatically every time the user submits a prompt in future sessions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Automated prompt monitoring and logging. The installed hook script captures the full text of user prompts and the current working directory path, appending them to files in
~/.claude/worklog/. This creates a local repository of sensitive user interaction data that persists on the filesystem. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface via worklog processing. The skill reads and summarizes log files that contain raw, unsanitized user prompts.
- Ingestion points:
~/.claude/worklog/*.md(referenced in SKILL.md, Step 2) - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions used to distinguish captured log content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory:
Read,Glob,Write,Edit, andBashcommands (cat, cp, chmod, ls, date) as defined in the skill's allowed-tools. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill processes the raw content of the log files directly into a prose report without escaping or validation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata