skills/wilmanbarrios/skills/worklog/Gen Agent Trust Hub

worklog

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs persistent modification of the agent's environment by installing a UserPromptSubmit hook. It executes shell commands to create the ~/.claude/hooks/ directory, copies a script into the user's home folder, and applies execution permissions (chmod +x). Furthermore, it programmatically parses and merges new configuration into the agent's primary settings.json file to ensure the script runs automatically in the background.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a background logging mechanism that captures all user prompts and saves them to ~/.claude/worklog/. While stored locally, this creates a centralized repository of potentially sensitive user data, including proprietary code, internal project details, and intent, which can be accessed or exfiltrated by other processes or skills without further user interaction.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes raw log files composed of previously captured user prompts.
  • Ingestion points: Raw text entries are read from ~/.claude/worklog/YYYYMMDD.md in Step 2.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill does not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the log data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to file modification tools (Edit, Write) and system commands (Bash), providing a significant attack surface if malicious instructions are processed from the logs.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill processes the raw logs directly into a prose summary, which could allow maliciously crafted prompts in the logs to influence the agent's behavior during the summarization or saving phase.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 01:55 PM