robot-personality

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Directory Traversal. The robot_load_personality tool in index.js uses path.resolve on the user-controlled name parameter without sanitization. This allows an attacker to bypass the intended directory constraint and read arbitrary files from the filesystem by using parent directory references (e.g., ../../etc/passwd).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill's core functionality involves loading and parsing markdown-based personality files (.md) which are then used to influence the agent's behavioral identity and safety checks.
  • Ingestion points: Personality files are loaded from disk in index.js and parsed in lib/personality.js.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates provided in the documentation do not include sufficient delimiters to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions contained within the personality data.
  • Capability inventory: Includes tools for influencing behavioral responses (robot_behavior) and performing safety evaluations (robot_safety_check).
  • Sanitization: The parser in lib/personality.js extracts content using regular expressions without performing validation or sanitization of the values against known instruction patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 05:11 AM