secure-sandbox

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides tools (sandbox_exec) that use child_process.execSync and child_process.spawn with shell: true to execute arbitrary strings as shell commands. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, it creates a high-risk capability that depends entirely on the effectiveness of the internal filters.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The command risk classifier in lib/classifier.js and the default allowlist in lib/allowlist.js categorize the cat command as 'safe' and 'auto-approve'. This configuration allows an agent to read sensitive local data, such as private keys, environment variables, or system configuration files, without triggering a manual approval workflow.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated scans detected patterns for piping remote scripts to a shell (e.g., curl | bash). These patterns are present in lib/classifier.js as part of the security blocklist and in test/sandbox.test.js as test cases to verify the blocker's functionality. While flagged by scanners, they are used here as part of the security logic rather than as active malicious payloads.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The sandbox_exec function allows users to provide an env object, which enables the injection of arbitrary environment variables into the execution context. This could be used to override application behavior or expose sensitive environment data.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The destructive path detection in lib/classifier.js specifically targets absolute paths (e.g., /etc/, /bin/). This logic can be bypassed using relative path traversal (e.g., ../../etc/passwd), which is not covered by the regex used to identify dangerous targets.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://example.com, https://evil.com/script.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 05:11 AM