text-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
replacecommand intext.shis vulnerable tosedscript injection. User-provided patterns and replacements are directly interpolated into thesedcommand string (e.g.,sed "s/$PATTERN/$REPLACEMENT/g"). An attacker can use the/delimiter to terminate the substitution and inject additionalsedcommands. In environments where GNUsedis used, theeflag can be exploited to execute arbitrary shell commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Due to the
sedinjection vulnerability, an attacker can use ther(read) orw(write) commands within the manipulatedsedscript to access or exfiltrate sensitive files from the system or modify existing configuration files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes raw text from external files without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The
get_inputfunction intext.shreads data directly from user-specified files or standard input. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions used to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the text being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful system utilities including
sed,awk,python3,sort,tr, andxxd. - Sanitization: While the script attempts to escape some characters for literal replacements, it lacks validation for regex-based replacements, leaving the system open to the injection vectors described above.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata