skills/within-7/aiter/memory/Gen Agent Trust Hub

memory

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation defines several fields specifically intended to store and execute arbitrary shell commands.
  • In tasks.md, the action field is used for task-related commands, such as cd ecommerce-backend && npm test && npm run deploy:staging.
  • In monitors.md, the command and autoRemediate fields contain executable logic for system monitoring and recovery, such as systemctl restart postgresql, pm2 restart api-server, and complex pipelines like df -h / | awk 'NR==2 {print $5}' | tr -d '%'.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes and potentially executes data stored in local files that the agent updates based on external interactions.
  • Ingestion points: Files located in .aiter/memory/ (specifically tasks.md, monitors.md, and knowledge.md) serve as the source of truth for agent actions.
  • Boundary markers: The file formats lack delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing these files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute subprocesses and system-level commands (e.g., systemctl, npm, pm2) based on the content of the memory files.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of validation, escaping, or sanitization for the strings retrieved from the memory files before they are passed to a shell for execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 4, 2026, 04:10 PM