memory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation defines several fields specifically intended to store and execute arbitrary shell commands.
- In
tasks.md, theactionfield is used for task-related commands, such ascd ecommerce-backend && npm test && npm run deploy:staging. - In
monitors.md, thecommandandautoRemediatefields contain executable logic for system monitoring and recovery, such assystemctl restart postgresql,pm2 restart api-server, and complex pipelines likedf -h / | awk 'NR==2 {print $5}' | tr -d '%'. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes and potentially executes data stored in local files that the agent updates based on external interactions.
- Ingestion points: Files located in
.aiter/memory/(specificallytasks.md,monitors.md, andknowledge.md) serve as the source of truth for agent actions. - Boundary markers: The file formats lack delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing these files.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute subprocesses and system-level commands (e.g.,
systemctl,npm,pm2) based on the content of the memory files. - Sanitization: There is no mention of validation, escaping, or sanitization for the strings retrieved from the memory files before they are passed to a shell for execution.
Audit Metadata