skills/witooh/skills/gitlab-copilot/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gitlab-copilot

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided or externally-fetched data (such as repo references, MR IDs, and generated comments) directly into bash commands using the glab CLI. If these variables contain shell metacharacters like ;, &, or $(), it could lead to arbitrary command execution in the local environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes untrusted data from an external source (GitLab).
  • Ingestion points: MR diffs fetched via glab mr diff and existing MR comments fetched via glab mr note list.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts use markdown headers (e.g., ## Diff, ## Existing MR Comments) to separate data, but they lack explicit instructions for the model to ignore any instructions embedded within the diff or comments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the bash tool for executing CLI commands and the skill tool to trigger the neo-team-copilot skill, which performs automated code changes.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from GitLab before it is passed to the specialist agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 06:24 PM