skills/witooh/skills/neo-team-kiro/Gen Agent Trust Hub

neo-team-kiro

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a comprehensive list of shell commands for managing and querying live infrastructure using kubectl, psql, argocd, and docker in the references/system-analyzer-cli-tools.md file. While intended for diagnostics, these commands grant significant control over the deployment environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The references/system-analyzer.md instructions guide the agent to read sensitive environment files (e.g., .env.sit, .env.uat, .env.prod) to retrieve configuration and database credentials. Reading these files exposes secrets to the agent's context.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The system analyzer agent is instructed to fetch logs and database records which may contain sensitive data, PII, or internal system details.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by design, as it incorporates untrusted data from project files (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md) and live system logs into agent prompts.
    • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (project documentation), references/system-analyzer.md (infrastructure logs and database query results).
    • Boundary markers: The orchestration logic uses Markdown headers to separate context but lacks explicit safety instructions to prevent the execution of commands found within the data.
    • Capability inventory: The subagents possess extensive capabilities including shell access (Bash), file reading (fs_read), and file modification (Write, Edit).
    • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content read from external files or logs before it is passed to the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 22, 2026, 03:35 PM