xiaohongshu-note-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
image_gen.pyscript executes system commands (ioregon macOS,wmicon Windows) to retrieve hardware UUIDs used for a local API key encryption feature. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdusepython3 -cto dynamically decode Base64 image data and save it to temporary files for subsequent processing by image generation tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with well-known third-party AI services for image generation, including Google Gemini, Alibaba DashScope, ByteDance ARK (Dreamina), and OpenRouter.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User note content and images are sent to external AI providers as part of the intended content rewriting and image generation workflows.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits surface area for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
read_notewhen processing user-provided WPS notes. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested note content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to WPS note modification tools (
batch_edit), shell command execution (image_gen.py), and network access to AI providers. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the external note content is performed before interpolation into LLM prompts.
Audit Metadata