latex-posters
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute LaTeX compilation commands and PDF utility programs.\n
- Evidence: Use of
pdflatex,bibtex,lualatex, andxelatexfor document generation.\n - Evidence: Use of
pdfinfo,pdffonts, andpdfimagesfor PDF inspection within thescripts/review_poster.shscript.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install LaTeX packages using the TeX Live manager.\n - Evidence: Use of
tlmgr installfor packagesbeamerposter,tikzposter, andbaposter, which are hosted on official TeX Live repositories.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its operational design.\n - Ingestion points: The skill is designed to convert untrusted external content, such as scientific papers, abstracts, and research summaries, into poster layouts (File:
SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: None identified. The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate user-provided data from agent instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Edit, andReadtools (File:SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: None identified. No processes for filtering or validating the research content are mentioned before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata