mao

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script internal/final_validation.py contains dynamic code execution using the exec() function. It constructs import statements using f-strings and variable names defined in a hardcoded list. While the source of these names is currently internal, the use of exec() with string interpolation is a high-risk pattern that can lead to code injection if external inputs are introduced.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The test runner internal/tests/run_all_tests.py uses subprocess.run() to execute Python scripts. Although the scripts being run are local to the package, the ability to spawn subprocesses is a powerful capability that allows for arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires several third-party Python libraries listed in requirements.txt, such as jieba, requests, pandas, and numpy. These are standard packages but are fetched from external registries during installation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied problem descriptions for analysis through various methodological frameworks. The implementation in tools/analytics_layer.py and tools/smart_recommender.py relies on keyword matching. However, the lack of robust boundary markers or sanitization for user input before processing by the agent could allow for prompt injection attempts meant to manipulate the agent's persona or logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 10, 2026, 04:56 AM