x-cmd-git
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection vulnerability surface. The skill is designed to ingest data from external sources and has significant write/execute capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Commands like
x gh issue,x gh pr, andx gl mrread content (titles, descriptions, comments) from external platforms. - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between its own system instructions and the content of the issues or PRs it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform high-impact operations including
repo clone,pr create,action workflow(managing CI/CD), andgithook apply(modifying local git behavior). - Sanitization: None. External content is likely processed directly by the agent's logic.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The documentation instructs users to configure authentication by passing sensitive API tokens directly as command-line arguments (e.g.,
x gh --cfg token=<github-token>). This practice exposes secrets to the system's shell history and process list (ps), making them accessible to other users or malicious processes on the same machine. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
x githook applycommand allows for the modification of Git hooks. If an attacker can influence the configuration file processed by this command (via a malicious PR or repository content), they could achieve local code execution when Git actions are triggered.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata