mcp-dev
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill creates a significant attack surface by ingesting and acting upon untrusted data from the local environment.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/scan_mcp.shscript reads content fromsrc/,src-tauri/, anddev-docs/. The workflow inSKILL.mdalso references validation against local implementation plans. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to distinguish between its system instructions and data found within the scanned files.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to modify sensitive files including
.mcp.json, system hooks, and plugins, as defined in theSKILL.mdworkflow. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from scanned files is processed directly to guide integration work.
- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (LOW): The skill identifies sensitive local configuration paths such as
.mcp.jsonand.claude/settings.local.json. While no exfiltration logic (network calls) is present in the provided files, the exposure of these paths to an agent processing untrusted source code increases the risk of data leakage if the agent is compromised via injection. - Command Execution (LOW): The skill includes a shell script (
scripts/scan_mcp.sh) that executesrg(ripgrep). The command is hardcoded to specific directories and does not directly incorporate user-controlled variables, making it low risk for direct command injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata