browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit shell and PowerShell commands to launch Google Chrome or Chromium with remote debugging enabled (
--remote-debugging-port=9222) and relaxed origin policies (--remote-allow-origins=*). This configuration reduces the browser's built-in security to facilitate automation. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The command
agent-browser eval <javascript>andagent-browser wait --fn "condition"allow for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context. This capability can be exploited if the agent interpolates untrusted input into these commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Several commands allow the extraction of sensitive information, including
agent-browser cookies,agent-browser storage local, andagent-browser snapshot. The skill also supports saving and loading full authentication states to the local filesystem usingagent-browser state save <path>. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted content from web pages via
snapshot,get text, andget html. This external data enters the agent's context and could contain malicious instructions that manipulate the agent's subsequent actions. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(viaget text,get html,snapshotcommands) - Boundary markers: Absent; no explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions within web content are provided in the skill instructions.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.md(arbitrary JS execution viaeval, file writes viastate saveandscreenshot, network interaction via browser navigation andset headers) - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any methods for filtering or escaping the data retrieved from web pages before processing.
Audit Metadata