excalidraw-mcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface by reading untrusted content from an external Excalidraw canvas and using it to drive agent decisions and actions.
- Ingestion Points: Data enters the agent context via
get_resource,query_elements, and theGET /api/elementsREST API endpoints. - Boundary Markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between diagram metadata and malicious instructions embedded in shape text or labels.
- Capability Inventory: The skill has the ability to execute local shell commands (
node scripts/*.cjs), write to the local file system (export-elements.cjs), and perform destructive canvas operations (clear-canvas.cjs). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation or filtering of content retrieved from the canvas before it is processed or used in script arguments.
- Command Execution (HIGH): The workflow encourages the agent to execute Node.js scripts with complex JSON strings passed as command-line arguments. If the agent populates the
--dataflag with content retrieved from the canvas, it creates a risk of command injection or malicious payload delivery. - Evidence:
node scripts/create-element.cjs --data '{...}'andnode scripts/update-element.cjs --id <id> --data '{...}'inreferences/cheatsheet.md. - Data Exposure (LOW): The skill interacts with a local service (
http://localhost:3000). While this is standard for the described purpose, it represents a internal network access point that could be abused if theEXPRESS_SERVER_URLis redirected to other internal services.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata