ljg-travel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes content from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: External URLs from platforms like Bilibili, Zhihu, and WeChat are analyzed using the
ContentAnalysistool (found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the processed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill writes structured files to
~/Documents/notes/and executes theljg-cardtool based on the synthesized data. - Sanitization: No explicit content filtering or sanitization steps are defined for the data returned from external queries.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow invokes the
ljg-cardtool with multiple flags (-i,-l) to generate image-based reference cards from the researched data. This tool appears to be a vendor-specific resource associated with the author. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs extensive research by fetching data from multiple well-known social and media platforms, including Bilibili, Zhihu, WeChat, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu, using platform-provided research tools.
Audit Metadata