retrospective
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads 'work logs', 'error history', and 'conversation context' (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill primarily generates text output and 'Memory Updates' for the agent; it lacks direct capabilities for subprocess execution, file-system writing, or network requests.
- Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of filtering or validating the content of the logs or conversation history before analysis.
Audit Metadata