a2ui-embed

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to render arbitrary HTML and JavaScript provided by the agent into a UI component.
  • Ingestion points: The agent writes content directly to a2ui_input.log in SKILL.md Step 3.
  • Boundary markers: Uses <!-- A2UI:START --> markers, but these are functional for the parser and do not provide security isolation for the content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows writing to local log files and starting a Python-based WebSocket server (a2ui_sidecar.py).
  • Sanitization: None. The instructions explicitly tell the agent to include <script> tags and suggest dangerous iframe sandbox parameters like allow-same-origin and allow-scripts, which can lead to UI-level exploitation if the agent processes malicious external content.
  • Command Execution (HIGH): The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands to manage background processes and interact with local configuration files.
  • Evidence: Instructions include python3 .../a2ui_sidecar.py &, ss -tlnp, and cat .../projects.json.
  • Risk: If an attacker can influence the paths or terminal IDs via prompt injection, they could potentially manipulate which scripts are executed or gain insights into the system's network state.
  • Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill accesses sensitive local configuration files and specific user directories.
  • Evidence: Accesses /home/yousuf/GoogleDrive/PROJECTS/.triclaude/projects.json to extract terminal IDs and ports.
  • Risk: Unauthorized access to internal project metadata and terminal session information.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 10:46 PM