context-manager

[Skill Scanner] Skill instructions include directives to hide actions from user This skill description is coherent and functionally aligned with its stated purpose: building compact compiled context artifacts from repository state. I found no evidence of direct malicious behavior (no exfiltration endpoints, no obfuscated code, no hardcoded secrets). However, the design does carry moderate security risk from unintended disclosure: CMS will read many repository files and ingest agent session logs but the spec does not define redaction, secret exclusion, or a strict trust model for agent-provided session data. That gap could allow sensitive configuration or secrets to be summarized into artifacts or allow a malicious/compromised agent to inject content into DELTA via SESSION logs. Overall I judge this as not overtly malicious but carrying measurable supply-chain/data-leak risk unless implemented with secret redaction, strict path whitelists, and agent trust controls. LLM verification: The CMS spec is functionally coherent and describes a local-only compilation process that generates compact context artifacts for agent bootstrapping. There is no explicit malicious code, network exfiltration, or obfuscation visible in the provided fragment. However, the spec is underspecified regarding which files are permitted for inclusion and lacks technical controls for secret detection/redaction and enforcement of non-scanning constraints. The static scanner note about hiding actions incre