nature-paper-to-patent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/build_patent_package.pyusesimportlib.util.spec_from_file_locationto dynamically load internal Python modules such asvalidate_patent_draft.pyandaudit_claims.pyfrom calculated file system paths. This pattern can be exploited if the file system is compromised.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/disclosure/mermaid_render.pyattempts to execute the@mermaid-js/mermaid-clitool. If not found locally, it usesnpx -yto download and run the package from the public npm registry at runtime, which introduces a supply chain risk through automatic execution of external code.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently usessubprocess.runto invoke external tools (like Mermaid CLI) and other Python scripts in the package. While the implementation uses argument lists (which are generally safer than shell strings), it presents a risk if user-controlled content influences the command line arguments.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scriptsscripts/disclosure/cnipa_epub_crawler.pyandscripts/disclosure/cnipa_epub_search.pyperform network operations tohttp://epub.cnipa.gov.cn/to scrape patent data. This interaction with a non-whitelisted domain includes logic to bypass automation detection and fetch data into the local environment.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes technically complex and untrusted user materials, such as research papers (PDF), source code, Word documents, and PowerPoint presentations.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters via
scripts/extract_pdf_text.py,scripts/disclosure/docx_to_md.py, andscripts/disclosure/pptx_to_md.py.\n - Boundary markers: While
SKILL.mdrequires features to be mapped to source IDs, it lacks explicit safety instructions to the agent to ignore hidden commands within the analyzed documents.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network scraping, file writing, and subprocess execution, which could be abused if an indirect injection successfully overrides agent instructions.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of technical content sanitization or filtering of the extracted technical prose before it is processed by the AI models.
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