conductor-pro
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to decompose external requests into atomic sub-tasks and orchestrate other agents. This creates a significant vulnerability where malicious instructions embedded in user-provided data or external files could influence the orchestration logic.
- Ingestion points: The 'Requirement Decomposition' step (Step 1) in the workflow in
SKILL.mdprocesses external requests directly. - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore instructions within the data being decomposed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to call
codebase_investigator(file system access),db-enforcer(database modification), and genericactivate_skillcommands. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic for validating or escaping content before it is passed to the sub-agent tools.
- [Persistence Mechanisms] (LOW): The skill implements a 'Plan Persistence' protocol that stores state in
~/.gemini/plans/. While intended for session recovery, this allows the agent to maintain and execute long-running sets of instructions across sessions, which could be exploited to maintain a foothold if a malicious plan is initialized. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes a cheat sheet to chain tactical skills like
db-enforcerandprisma-expert. While these are defined within its internal registry, the lack of input validation on theobjectiveparameter passed to these tools poses a risk of unintended command execution or privilege misuse.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata