openapi-pro

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill protocol requires the execution of shell and TypeScript scripts (e.g., scripts/generate-client.sh, scripts/validate-spec.ts) that are referenced but not provided in the source files. Executing unverified local scripts can lead to arbitrary code execution if an attacker places malicious files in the expected paths.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill uses bun x to download and execute tools like openapi-typescript, orval, and redocly from the public npm registry. Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], these are downgraded to LOW/INFO as npm is a standard registry, but the lack of version pinning remains a minor risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted OpenAPI specifications (openapi.yaml) and derived Zod schemas are ingested into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no delimiters or system-level instructions to ignore embedded natural language commands within the specification's descriptions or metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands (bun x, scripts/*.sh) and generate code that may be used in production environments.
  • Sanitization: None. There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the OpenAPI content before it influences the agent's behavior or code generation process.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:54 AM