gitlab-mcp-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes content from external GitLab entities.
- Ingestion points: Data from tools like
get_issue,get_merge_request_notes,search_code, andget_pipeline_job_outputcan contain malicious instructions from third-party contributors. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to wrap retrieved content in delimiters or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides powerful tools for committing code (
push_files), triggering pipelines (create_pipeline), and downloading files (download_job_artifacts). - Sanitization: The instructions do not define sanitization or filtering logic for data retrieved from the GitLab API.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool
download_job_artifactsaccepts alocal_pathparameter, allowing the agent to write artifact files directly to the local file system. This capability should be used with caution to prevent overwriting sensitive local files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes high-impact tools such as
push_files,create_or_update_file, andexecute_graphqlwhich allow the agent to perform significant modifications to remote repositories and execute arbitrary queries against the GitLab instance.
Audit Metadata