github
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill creates a high-privilege vulnerability surface where untrusted external data can influence agent logic.
- Ingestion points: Scripts
list_repos.ts,get_repo_info.ts, andlist_prs.tsretrieve and display content from GitHub API endpoints (repository names, descriptions, and PR titles) which are under the control of potentially untrusted third parties. - Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts output raw API data directly to the console without using delimiters (like XML tags or Markdown blocks) or providing the agent with instructions to disregard embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides the
create_pr.tsscript, which allows the agent to perform write operations (POST requests) to GitHub repositories. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved API data is performed before it is presented to the agent's context.
- [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill relies on
npx tsxto execute its logic. While a standard pattern for TypeScript execution, it requires a shell environment and relies on thenpxpackage runner, which introduces a dependency on the integrity of the local environment and the npm registry. - [Credential Safety] (INFO): The skill uses a
github_tokenconfigured via an external workspace manager. While it avoids hardcoded secrets, users should ensure the token has the minimum necessary scopes to mitigate the impact of potential session hijacking or injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata