docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses runtime code generation and process injection techniques to overcome environment-specific limitations for LibreOffice.
- The script
scripts/office/soffice.pygenerates C source code at runtime and compiles it into a shared library usinggcc. It then launchessofficewith theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this library, shimming standard system calls related to Unix domain sockets. - The script
scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro (.xbafile) and writes it to the temporary user profile to automate document editing tasks. - Multiple components (e.g.,
pack.py,unpack.py,accept_changes.py) utilizesubprocess.runto execute external binaries includingsoffice,gcc,git,pandoc, andpdftoppmfor document processing and conversion. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires external software packages to be installed by the user to achieve full functionality.
- The
SKILL.mddocumentation instructs the user to install thedocxlibrary globally usingnpm install -g docx. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Word documents, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill extracts text and XML data from
.docxfiles usingpandocand custom Python parsing logic inscripts/office/unpack.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between its own logic and the processed document content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including file system access, runtime compilation, and the execution of powerful binaries like
sofficeandpandoc. - Sanitization: While the skill uses
defusedxmlto mitigate XML-based attacks (e.g., XXE), it does not implement sanitization or filtering for natural language instructions embedded within the document text.
Audit Metadata