social-push
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection within its image rendering pipeline. It converts user-provided Markdown into HTML and loads it into a headless browser (Playwright) to generate images.\n
- Ingestion points: Markdown content and metadata from user-supplied files processed by rendering scripts in the
scripts/directory.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. External content is interpolated directly into HTML templates (e.g.,
assets/card.html).\n - Capability inventory: Headless browser control via Playwright and shell command execution capabilities provided by the
agent-browserandBashtools.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The scripts use the
marked(Node.js) andmarkdown(Python) libraries to generate HTML without visible sanitization, which could allow the execution of embedded scripts in the rendering context.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands and runtime script evaluation to perform its social media automation tasks.\n - Execution patterns: Uses
agent-browser eval "js"to execute code in the browser context. It also utilizesosascriptto interact with the system clipboard for transferring image data and text.\n - Self-evolution: The
SKILL.mdfile instructs the agent to autonomously modify workflow files in thereferences/directory to correct interaction paths when page structures change.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local files to prepare them for upload, which could be misused to access sensitive data.\n - Evidence: Workflows in
references/小红书长文.mdandreferences/知乎想法.mduse shell commands likecat "{文件路径}"andread (POSIX file "{图片路径}")viaosascriptto read files into the system clipboard. The skill does not implement validation for these file paths.
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