pptx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of several local Python and JavaScript scripts to perform core tasks, including unpacking OOXML files, generating thumbnails, and replacing presentation text.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include high-privilege system commands using sudo to install system-level dependencies such as libreoffice and poppler-utils.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external system binaries like soffice (LibreOffice) for PDF conversion and pdftoppm for image generation from PDF files.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Multiple external packages are downloaded and installed from public registries (PyPI and NPM) as part of the skill setup, including markitdown, pptxgenjs, and playwright.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external .pptx files.
  • Ingestion points: Content is extracted from user-provided PowerPoint files via markitdown and raw XML unpacking from the .pptx (ZIP) archive.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the extracted text as untrusted data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing local scripts, running system binaries, and modifying the local filesystem.
  • Sanitization: While the skill recommends defusedxml for secure XML parsing, this only protects against XML-level attacks (like XXE) and does not prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded within the slide text.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 25, 2026, 08:22 AM