skill-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
run_eval.py,improve_description.py, andrun_loop.pyexecute the system'sclaudeCLI tool using thesubprocessmodule. This capability is used to automate the testing and optimization of skill descriptions by running queries against the model. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
run_eval.pydynamically writes new skill definition files (Markdown with YAML frontmatter) to the.claude/commands/directory. This is a sensitive system path where Claude Code discovers and loads available skills, meaning the script can modify the agent's available toolset at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
run_eval.pyandimprove_description.pyexplicitly manipulate the environment of their subprocesses to remove theCLAUDECODEenvironment variable. This is a deliberate bypass of a built-in safety mechanism in the Claude CLI designed to prevent recursive or nested agent execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from
evals/evals.jsonand user-provided test prompts (Ingestion points) and interpolates them into instructions for subagents. While it uses XML-style tags as delimiters (Boundary markers), it lacks robust sanitization for the raw query strings (Sanitization). The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including file writes to configuration paths and CLI execution (Capability inventory), which could be exploited if malicious instructions are embedded in the evaluation data.
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