The Agent Skills Directory

Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest external code and problem statements for analysis and 'automated editing'. It lacks any boundary markers or sanitization for this untrusted data.
Ingestion points: codex -p "<DETAILED CONTEXT>" in SKILL.md uses Read, Grep, and Glob to gather context.
Boundary markers: Absent. Instructions are interpolated directly into the CLI prompt.
Capability inventory: Use of Bash for command execution, WebFetch for network access, and the codex CLI's native ability to modify files (bypassing the agent's disallowedTools restriction on Write/Edit).
Sanitization: Absent. Untrusted code snippets are passed directly to the model/CLI.
Command Execution & Privilege Escalation (HIGH): The skill uses Bash to execute an external codex binary with dangerous configurations.
Evidence: Usage of --sandbox danger-full-access and --full-auto flags which permit network access and autonomous execution.
Privilege Bypass: codex-agent.md explicitly states 'All file modifications must go through codex CLI' to circumvent the fact that Write and Edit tools are disallowed for the agent itself.
Metadata Poisoning & Misleading Claims (MEDIUM): The skill references 'gpt-5.2' and 'gpt-5.2-codex' models which do not currently exist, suggesting either hallucinated instructions or a specialized/potentially malicious environment.
Dynamic Execution / Self-Modification (MEDIUM): The 'Heal-Skill' integration allows the skill to modify its own SKILL.md documentation based on the output of codex --help. This could be exploited to inject new malicious instructions if the CLI output is compromised.
Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM): While it doesn't download a script and pipe it to bash directly, it relies on an external, unverified binary (codex) and provides it with full-auto capabilities over the local workspace.

codex