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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The
notebooktool'srun_celloperation inNOTEBOOK.mdallows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript and TypeScript code. While this is the primary purpose of the tool, it represents a high-risk capability that could be exploited to run malicious commands if the agent is manipulated. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The
notebooktool includes aninstall_depsoperation (documented inNOTEBOOK.md) that permits the installation of third-party packages from npm. This allows for the introduction of unverifiable dependencies that may contain malicious scripts executed during the installation or runtime phases. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): The
notebooktool providesloadandexportoperations (NOTEBOOK.md) that interact with the local filesystem. These can be used to read sensitive system files (e.g., config, credentials) or write files to persistent locations (e.g., startup scripts), creating exposure and persistence risks. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). An attacker could provide a malicious
.src.mdnotebook file that, when loaded, instructs the agent to execute harmful code or exfiltrate data. - Ingestion points:
notebook({ operation: "load", args: { path: "..." } })andadd_cell(documented inNOTEBOOK.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to ignore embedded commands in loaded content.
- Capability inventory:
run_cell,install_deps, andexportoperations provide significant system access (NOTEBOOK.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or sanitization for content loaded into the notebook.
Audit Metadata