last30days
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill mandates the execution of a pre-bundled JavaScript file
fluxa-cli.bundle.js. Bundled code is effectively obfuscated and impossible to audit for malicious behavior, such as credential theft or establishing backdoors. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): Research topics, user intent, and agent metadata (faked emails and names) are transmitted to
proxy-monetize.fluxapay.xyz. This domain is not a trusted source, and the transmission of user-specific research topics constitutes data exfiltration. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The core workflow requires the agent to execute multiple shell commands using
nodeandpython3to manage a 'wallet' and interact with external payment proxies. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The instructions in
fluxa-wallet/initialize-agent-id.mddirect the agent to 'Generate these parameters yourself' and 'Do not ask the user to fill them in'. This is a direct attempt to bypass user transparency and consent during the registration process for a third-party service. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted content from Reddit and X.
- Ingestion points: Reddit threads via
openai_reddit.pyand X posts viaxai_x.py. - Boundary markers: Missing; the prompt templates in
openai_reddit.pyandxai_x.pydo not include delimiters or 'ignore' warnings for the fetched content. - Capability inventory: File system writes (
report.md), network requests (http.py), and command execution (fluxa-cli.bundle.js). - Sanitization: Limited to simple text truncation and relevance scoring; lacks semantic sanitization.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata